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BOOK REVIEWS
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT. By
WALLACE MENDELSON. New York: Dodd Mead and Company,
1959. Pp. 520. $6.50.
It is indeed difficult to review a book such as this. In the first
place, this is a case-text designed for use in courses in constitutional
law. The difficulty is that texts are more or less valuable depending
upon the objective of the course for which they are selected. Second-
ly, text books, especially those of the case-method variety, present a
dilemma to the reviewer because they are apt to present relatively
well-accepted doctrine while attempting to obtain variety or "im-
provement" by deleting parts of this doctrine and developing aspects
not contained in previous texts. Accordingly, a review must attempt
to weigh the effects of the deletions and additions and simultaneously
to ascertain precisely what direction the new design pursues. Also, it
is a rather difficult exercise to switch continuously from author to
court and back again as one balances and weighs the materials. This
is especially true since I am of the school of thought which is quite
convinced that the Supreme Court is not omniscient, and therefore
I feel quite free to differ with decisions which the Court has reached
from time to time. Despite these peculiarities which confound a
reviewer of this type of book, it would seem to be an acceptable
premise that such a book must present itself and withstand analysis
in competition with other books in the particular field involved.
The author seeks, as indeed he relates in his introduction, to pre-
sent his material in such a way that students will be diverted from
"the more traditional arrangement"1 by which they fail "to see the
Constitution for the clauses."' Certainly this goal has not been accom-
plished. In fact, because of the emphasis on certain clauses, vision of
the Constitution has been obstructed. This is not really the fault of
the author, however, but an inevitable result of the case method of
presentation. Undoubtedly this method has its advantages, e.g., it
concretely illustrates interpretation of the Constitution in actual life
situations. By the same method, however, invaluable time is spent
upon clauses that obscure the view of the Constitution and upon
words which obscure the view of the clauses.
One need not read far into the text before he observes an
illuminated sign suggesting the course of philosophy to be taken in




inarticulate faith that within the four corners of the written Consti-
tution are to be found the answers to all social problems and that
courts have special competence to read what is written there."3 From
this page to the bitter end, the author presents selected materials,
principally cases from the Supreme Court, in harmony with his
philosophical beliefs.
This book contains more than eighty cases, and some half dozen
of them are from the 1957-58 term of the Supreme Court. While
neither the number of cases nor their vintage gauge the value of a
book in constitutional law, it is interesting to note that the opinions
were written by only twenty-seven Justices. No constitutional
law book would dare proceed without paying tribute to Chief Justice
John Marshall because his obiter dictum established the philosophy of
the court, and the philosophy of Marshall has in one way or another
touched upon virtually every facet of constitutional law. According-
ly, Marshall rates five of these precious cases. The only other justices
rating as many are Black, Douglas, and Stone. Cardozo, Reed, Jack-
son, and (although he is relatively new on the court) Mr. Chief
Justice Warren each have four decisions of the magic eighty. It
is, considering the philosophies of the above justices, most surprising
that only three of the All-American opinions were written by Mr.
Justice Holmes, but this situation is partly alleviated by the fact that
he repeatedly appears on the scene in cases cited and in comments
given about the cases. But the bomb-shell has not yet been dropped.
The author pays the highest tribute of all to Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
who hits the scoreboard for eleven cases. Thus, if (as he purports
to do) the author covers the Constitution and not just the clauses,
he attributes in excess of thirteen percent of our constitutional law
to one judge. Perhaps in tribute we might well call our present Con-
stitution, as interpreted, "The Frankfurter Constitution."
From the opening passages where the author bemoans Marshall's
decisions permitting Congress to control "old Victorian" immorality
but restraining that body from controlling "modern 'immorality,'
as practiced by 'reputable' and 'orthodox' businesses . . .,'"to the
end where finally Congress is given almost complete control over
business and the individual becomes untouchable, the author has paved
the road with a steady succession of cases to demonstrate this trend.
This is justifiable, perhaps, in factually demonstrating a trend, but
the intermittent comments by the author rationalizing such a demise





and his often sarcastic and devastating remarks at judges or others
who would dare repudiate such a trend, along with his cleverly
worded, leading questions to decoy students in a "note," .comment,"
or "quaere" take the book out of the realm of an objective and factual
text and into the realm of personal bias fortified by court decision.
The book has, however, a fascinating core of cases, especially relat-
ing to facets of individual freedoms. The author has troubled him-
self to search out many "cases in point" to illustrate various ideas and
contentions and in this respect has done a remarkable job. But finally
it must be said that were an instructor to use only this book for a
constitutional law text his students would be woefully lacking in
many fundamental respects, for though it is thorough on some
subjects, (e.g., "freedom") it has lost too many fundamental con-
stitution-explaining cases. It has exchanged the fundamental for the
spectacular. It has traded the life of the Court for the life of
Frankfurter.
A. D. Miller*
THE SUPREME COURT AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS.
By GEORGE W. SPICER. New York: Appleton Century Crofts,
1959. Pp. viii, 182. $1.50.
This volume is not, and does not purport to be, a treatise on civil
liberties and the Supreme Court. The author's purpose is to discuss,
more or less in summary fashion, recent Supreme Court cases, deduc-
ing therefrom any significant trends or doctrinal attitudes underlying
the Court's approach in specific areas of constitutional law. This
Dr. Spicer does with admirable consistency, and the result of his
efforts is a compact, but useful, introduction to the role of the
judiciary in preserving and creating an appreciation for our freedoms.
Dr. Spicer considers the members of the Court to be "the guardians
of individual liberty against both national and state governments,"1
although he is fully aware that the case-by-case approach of a
judiciary will often lead to obscure and confusing results.
In addition to presenting a logical analysis of the Court's approach
on particular occasions or in specific areas of constitutional law, the
author points up the social interests involved. For example, while
peaceful picketing is properly recognized as an exercise of free speech,
it "is more than speech; it is an economic weapon, and as such, it




is subject to extensive regulation by the State with respect to both its
methods and its purposes."' While discussing internal security, Dr.
Spicer reminds us that "no thoughtful citizen would deny that
military and industrial information and equipment must be protected
from espionage and sabotage."3 It is, incidentally, his opinion that
great damage has been done civil liberties in this latter area. Persons
who are security minded "have no formula for separating the sub-
versive and disloyal from persons with political and economic views
more radical or progressive than those of the dominant element of
the community."4  Their formula, therefore, is to "restrain and
punish all whom [they] suspect of being disloyal or subversive."'
One of the most interesting chapters deals with political and social
equality. This chapter discusses, principally, decisions of the Court
invalidating Southern attempts to disfranchise the Negro, segregation
in public and interstate transportation, and, of course, the recent
decisions relating to segregation in education and on public golf
courses, beaches, parks, and playgrounds. This reviewer had hoped
to find a more thoughtful treatment of the desegregation cases but
Dr. Spicer, outside of presenting the rationale of the Brown case,'
says little about the constitutional issues involved and the Supreme
Court's method of handling the problem. Instead, he criticizes the
Virginia "Interposition" resolution and the "Southern Manifesto"
of 1956. Although these topics are of considerable interest, a dis-
cussion of them sheds little light on the Supreme Court's treatment
of public segreation since 1954. Are the issues so simple that the
Court is justified in outlawing segregation on public golf courses,
beaches, parks, and playgrounds, by a series of per curiam decisions
following in the wake of Brown v. Board of Educ.?7 One need not
quarrel with the result to wish that the Supreme Court had taken
time to present a full statement of the constitutional principles
involved.
Aside from the foregoing qualification, the reviewer recommends
this volume to one desiring a brief, clear statement of the work of
the Supreme Court in giving content to the constitutional guarantees







'Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
7 Ibid.
* Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
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